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ABSTRACT
Free open-source operating system (OS) has driven both ad revenue and Internet traffic from smartphones to the historically high
levels. Though achieving huge market share, there is no record showing that the profit of a handset maker from the smartphone
market can surpass the firm implementing vertical integration ever since the first smartphone has been launched in the market. In
this study, we consider that an open-source OS provider free offers its operating system but gain mobile advertising revenue by
demanding the hardware maker to install preload apps. After trading off between homogenizing each open-source smartphone but
gaining more “eyeball shares” on advertising via handsets due to more preload apps, we examine how the OS provider’s optimal
agreement with hardware makers changes with market factors. In addition, we also compare and analyze the profit of the OS
provider between launching its own brand of smartphones and receiving advertising revenue only. Our results suggest that the OS
provider should enhance the quality of its own product when entering the smartphone market. Moreover, if outsourcing the
production work to a hardware maker can achieve the economies of scale and increase its profit, our analytic results suggest that
the OS provider shouldn’t partner with the hardware maker dominating the smartphone market.
Keywords: in-app ads, vertical integration, operating system, outsourcing, production differentiation
INTRODUCTION
In the first quarter of 2015, market surveys have reported that the traffic volume and advertising revenue contributed by Android
has first time surpassed iOS. For increasing its market share rapidly to grow mobile ad revenue, Google, in control of developing
and maintaining Android, doesn’t charge any hardware makers installing the open-source operating system (OS). However,
hardware makers have to follow certain requirements, known as Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA), regulated
by Google; otherwise, some popular services and apps which are viewed as key components (such as APIs and Google Play) in the
ecosystem of Android cannot be offered in their smartphones. In recent years, both mobile search results and YouTube ad revenue
have surged up because mobile platforms have become a major channel to connect the Internet. The requirements which specify
how many Google apps have to be preloaded and where these gadgets are placed significantly link to the open source OS
provider’s profit.
To incentivize hardware makers to follow the placement standard of apps and create more ad revenue form preloaded gadgets,
Google has also shared a part of its advertising revenue with hardware makers. The details of sharing ratios are often not disclosed,
but many news reports are available to shed light on the contexts. Intuitively, the hardware maker having high market share should
be able to demand more from advertising revenue. Moreover, from the perspective of providing consistent experience in the
manipulation of software and raising more advertising revenue, an open-source OS provider may want to require more pre-load
apps on the home screen of smartphones; however, such a requirement may reduce the hardware makers’ profits because product
differentiation is more difficult to be achieved as the open-source OS provider increase the number of pre-load apps and demand
more prominent position for them. Once these smartphone products become more homogeneous, less differentiation will lead to
fierce competition in price among hardware makers, which may decline the open-source OS provider’s mobile ad revenue
eventually.
Launching its own brand of smartphone to acquire higher profit from the smartphone market could be a lucrative alternation for an
open-source OS provider. In addition, this means can offer software developers a platform featuring an updated version of
operating system for testing, encourage hardware makers to adopt the newest standards, and gain more “eyeball shares” on mobile
advertising by making the open source OS become universally accessible. However, such a strategy of releasing its own product,
achieved by either outsourcing or vertical integration, may endanger the partnership between the open-source OS provider and
hardware markers, and even intensify the competition among hardware makers. Interestingly, Google’s smartphone and tablet are
also co-developed and manufactured by the hardware makers in the market, as shown in Table 1. Moreover, though the market
share of iOS is less than 15% in recent years, it is reported that Apple’s revenue from iPhone accounted for 89% of all smartphone
profits. Considering such a marvelous instance and the fact that the market share of Android has increased to more than 80%,
building its own brand of smartphone is a “worthy of imitation” strategy for Google to expand its profit other than mobile
advertising revenue.
From the perspective of mobile advertising and smartphone sales, there are two research questions worthy to be further analyzed.
First, how would an open-source OS provider adjust the number of pre-loaded apps to enhance its profit in a fairly competitive
environment? We aim to investigate the impact of advertising revenue and the number of hardware makers on the optimal
agreement concerning pre-load apps. Second, we prescribe the condition under which it is profitable for an open-source OS
provider to make its own brand of smartphone. Finally, we analyze the open source OS provider’s decision of outsourcing from the
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viewpoint of co-competition relationship between the open-source OS provider and the hardware maker delegated to manufacture
the open source OS provider’s product.

Brand Name
Nexus One
Nexus S
Galaxy Nexus
Nexus 4
Nexus 7
Nexus 10
Nexus 5
Nexus 7 (2nd Generation)
Nexus 6
Nexus 9

Table 1. The history of Nexus
Product Type
Smartphone
Tablet
★
★
★
★
★
★
★
★
★
★

Release Date

Manufacturer

2010
2010
2011
2012
2012
2012
2013
2013
2014
2014

HTC
Samsung
Samsung
LG
ASUS
Samsung
LG
ASUS
Motorola Mobility
HTC

LITERATURE REVIEW
The quality of Apps and the content presented by them are the most critical in shaping the satisfaction of smartphone users [6]. In
fact, apps and web services themselves are even more important than the operating systems on smartphones because they may
replace the home screen of an operating system or offer a direct connection through the Internet [10]. Though granting a high
profit sharing ratio can encourage more app developers to join the platform and then leads to more sales, Fukawa and Zhang [3]
show that the strategy may be helpless and even harmful to the open source OS provider when its market share is higher than a
certain threshold. From the perspective of Google, it will be a top priority that ensuring high ad click-through rate by requiring the
number of preload apps on each android handset, which are able to put users on its search interface [5].
From the perspective of methodology used in this study, differentiated Cournot model has been widely applied to various different
contexts concerning the competition between firms selling substitutes. For instance, Wang [13] considers a duopolistic setting to
prescribe the conditions under which the firm with a cost-reducing innovation gains more from royalty licensing than a one-off
payment. Milliou and Petrakis [8] examine how the date of adopting a new technology changes with the level of product
differentiation. Tang et al. [9] indicate that high production cost and the advantage of scope economies are major driving forces for
outsourcing production work to third parties.
Strategic outsourcing is a global tendency in the manufacturing industry because this strategy can save cost and achieve higher
performance by delegating the manufacturer with comparative advantage against in-house production. Shy and Stenbacka [12]
find that economies of scale can be achieved in an oligopolistic input-producing industry structure because firms will outsource to
the same manufacturers. Xia and Gilbert [14] consider the scenario in which a supplier delegates a retailer to sell two substitutable
products and the supplier can provide demand-enhancing services by itself or outsources the service to the retailer. Their results
indicate that the decision of outsourcing is linked to the firm acting as a Stackelberg leader. Rothaermel et al. [11] highlight the
importance of balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing because their empirical results show that achieving a
balance in taper integration can increase competitive advantage and improve firm performance.
From the perspective of market structure, our research model is similar to the one analyzed by Foros [2], which investigates the
competition between two Internet service provider and shows that a vertical integrated ISP controlling the access network may
foreclosure an ISP connecting to the network by overinvesting in value-added services when its R&D in offering the services
surpasses the other. From the perspective of advertising, Giri and Sharma [4] consider the aspect of sharing advertising expenses
for enhancing consumer demand in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two competition retailers. By investigating the
supper’s decision on whether to share its retailers’ advertising costs and whether to levy different wholesale prices from them, their
numeral results demonstrate that differentiating the wholesale prices is always beneficial to the supplier. Yao et al. [15] consider
two heterogeneous value-adding retailers in a supply chain, both of which pay the same wholesale price to their common supplier
and only know their individual cost of value-added service. Their results show that both retailers, which are cost inefficient, are
willing to share their cost information with the supplier when the market demand is large enough. On the other hand, the private
information will be hidden when both have cost advantage. From the view of oligopolistic competition, Bagchi and Mukherjee [1]
study a supply chain with differentiated oligopoly in which a supplier can adopt royalty licensing or auction its licenses to retailers.
Their results indicate that the supplier prefers royalty licensing than auction when the number of retailers is not too small and the
degree of production differentiation is moderate.
Our model differs from prior studies in that the open source OS provider plays the role of a supplier but only receives advertising
revenue from hardware makers, which are similar to the retailers in supply-chain literatures. In addition, the supplier can share its
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advertising revenue with the retailers and regulate the degree of production differentiation by specifying the number of preload
apps and the location where the apps can be accessed. Moreover, we also examine the benefit of strategic outsourcing to one of the
retailers rather than outside manufacturers when the supplier establishes its own brand of handset.
THE MODEL
Consider an OS provider and two hardware makers in an open-source smartphone market. According to the agreement with the
OS provider, both hardware makers can use its operating system without any charge but have to install the apps appointed by the
OS provider on the home screen of their handsets. As a result, the OS provider can make a profit from the in-app ads delivered
through its preload apps even if there is no payment from the release of its developed operating system. However, once more
preload apps are demanded by the OS provider, the less degree of production differentiation the hardware makers suffer from.
Therefore, the OS provider has to trade off its advertising revenue from mobile advertising and the competition between hardware
makers.
To model the relation among the OS provider and two duopolistic hardware makers, a stylized Cournot differentiated model is
used to analyze how the OS provider base various market factors to adjust the requirement of its preload apps on the home screen of
handsets. Though smartphone users can also use the apps provided by the hardware makers or install other apps by searching in an
app market, we consider that the probability of using the preload apps on the home screen is higher than others and therefore
focus on the impact of the number of preload apps appointed by the OS provider on its profit. For simplicity, we let the ratio of
preload apps on the home screen handled by the OS provider is u and the hardware makers 1- u , respectively. The parameter
u not only captures the ratio of advertising revenue from apps between the OS provider and either hardware maker but also
represents the degree of production differentiation. Thus, letting qi , i = 1, 2 , be the quantities produced by hardware markers i,
the inverse demand function in the open-source smartphone market is given by
for i ¹ j
,
(1)
pi (qi , q j ) = a + qi - qi - uq j
where a represents market profitability [7] and qi measures individual maker’s product competitiveness [2]. As the ratio of
preload apps on the home screen increases, the market becomes more homogeneous because all open-source handsets have similar
appearance and functionality on their home screen when consumers make their first glances on the products.
Optimal Production Differentiation
In practice, after following the OS provider’s requirement, hardware makers can still preload their apps on the rest of space to gain
their own advertising revenue; in addition, the OS provider may consider sharing its advertising revenue with hardware makers to
strengthen their partnership and encourage them to strategically accommodate their products to the preload apps required by the
OS provider. Therefore, letting g be the ratio of advertising revenue taken by the OS provider and b the marginal advertising
revenue per demand, the profits of the hardware makers can be expressed as

pi = ( pi - c)qi + b (1- g) u qi b (1- u) qi ,

(2)

where c is marginal production cost. Though it seems more reasonable that all smartphone makers have different marginal
production cost, we simplify the issue because a heterogeneous setting doesn’t alter our qualitative results. Here, the value of g is
considered as an exogenous variable because the negotiation of how much advertising revenue to be split may involve the setting of
bargaining power, which is absent in our model. Moreover, the profit of the OS provider is given by
(3)

pg = b 跂
g u å qi

Based on backward induction and the static analysis on the optimal ratio of preload apps with respect to advertising revenue, we
have the following findings:
Proposition 1. (The impact of advertising revenue on the number of preload apps)
When the demand of advertising increases or the hardware maker’s share of advertising revenue decreases, the optimal number of
*
*
g< 0.
the preload apps required by the OS provider decreases. Formally, 順u b < 0 and 順u
Our results indicate that the OS provider should consider allowing its partner to preload more itself apps when advertising revenue
increases, no matter whether the adverting price increases or the OS provider has a higher share of advertising revenue from a new
agreement. Thus, this finding reminds the OS provider of the importance of balancing product differentiation and in-app ad
revenue. Recently, Google’s advertising revenue declines year by year; however, the intention of gaining more advertising revenue
from in-app ads is not just simply to arbitrarily increase the number of preload apps because this blind move without
understanding the influence of product differentiation on the smartphone market may erode its profit margins eventually.
Subsequently, we consider there are n hardware makers in the smartphone market. Thus, the inverse demand function in the
smartphone market is refined as
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pi (qi , q- i ) = a + qi - qi - uå q- i

,

(4)

To analyze how the OS provider dynamically update its agreement with hardware markers when the number of hardware makers in
the market increases, we consider all the makers have the same product competitiveness (that is qi = qˆfor all i) .
Proposition 2. (The impact of market competition on the number of preload apps)
From the perspective of profitability, as more hardware makers enter this open-source smartphone market, the operating system
provider should require the less number of preload apps to allow higher level of production differentiation. Formally,

順u *

n < 0 given in a homogeneous equilibrium.

In order to grow its user base and increase advertising revenue, this result shows that the OS provider can regulate the level of
production differentiation by decreasing the number of preload apps on the home screen when more and more hardware makers
launch their products in this market. Though it seems that the strategy will reduce the OS provider’s advertising revenue, allowing
hardware makers to deploy more apps according to their product positioning can facilitate better production differentiation, which
turns out to benefit the OS provider.
CO-COMPETITION
By outsourcing or vertical integration, the OS provider may also launch its brand of handset to grow its business in the smartphone
market. In the current version, we assume that all preload apps are regulated by the OS provider and the degree of production
differentiation is exogenously given; however, the inconsistency will be improved in the future revision. Therefore, following the
same inverse demand curve given in (1), if the OS provider chooses not to launch its own brand of smartphone, its profit and the
profits of the hardware makers are
(5)
p g ,N = b 跂
g ? q and p = ( p - c)q + b (1- g)?q
i

i

i

i

i

If the OS provider decides to launch its own smartphone in the market, the new inverse demand curve is given by
(6)

pi (qi , q- i ) = a + qi - qi - uå q- i
As a result, the profit of the OS provider can be expressed as

g ?(q1

p g ,Y = b ?(qg
Comparing p g

,Y

with p g

(7)

q2 ))+ ( pg - c) qg
,N

, we have the following findings:

Proposition 3. (The condition on production competitiveness for vertical outsourcing)
When the product competitiveness of the OS provider’s smartphone is not too weak, releasing its own brand of handset to the
market is better than serving as a pure OS provider. Formally, 

g ,Y

  g ,N when θ1  θ2  θ g .

When the OS provider’s production cost is the same as the other hardware makers, our result shows that the OS provider should
always launches its product to the market as long as its product quality is not too low as compared with the products launched by
the others. Even if the strategy may annoy its downstream partners and lead to more intensive competition, our finding helps
explain why Google still releases its own brand of smartphone and tablet in the market. In the following, the static analysis is
implemented to investigate the impact of market factors and the share of advertising revenue on the OS provider’s profit.
Proposition 4. (The comparison in profit between vertical specification and vertical outsourcing)
(1) When

a is smaller than a certain threshold,  g ,Y    g , N 

(2) When θ1  θ 2  θ g ,  g ,Y a   g , N a and  g ,Y c   g , N c
Our results indicate that low production cost and high market profitability are two important factors of supporting the decision of
vertical outsourcing. Though releasing its own brand of smartphone makes each firm gain less profit from the consumers, gaining
the dual profit made up of the sales of its product line and advertising revenue maintains comparable advantage against receiving
mobile ad revenue only as the produce cost decreases or market profitability increases, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. However, when
the market profitability is not high enough and all smartphones have symmetric product competitiveness, we find that the OS
provider should not enter the smartphone market when the share of the hardware makers’ advertising revenues from the OS
provider’s preload apps is too low, as shown in Figure 3. The results remind the OS provider of the importance of enhancing its
operating system and the quality of preload apps to attract more potential buyers because a small market cannot feed so many
hardware makers in a highly competitive ecosystem. Finally, though we cannot directly examine the impact of marginal
advertising revenue on the OS provider’s profit when it launches or not, the numerical result shown in Figure 4 is consistent with
our intuitive perspective that high advertising revenue motivates the OS provider to release its own brand of handset in the market.
The Fifteenth International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 6-10, 2015

81

Jhang-Li & Chen
Outsourcing Strategy
Subsequently, we consider the scenario in which the OS provider has decided to launch its product and outsource the production
work to one of the hardware makers due to cost consideration. The hardware maker having the order from the OS provider may
leverage economies of scale to reduce production cost and even earn addition profit from the OS provider. In such a complicated
relationship, the OS provider doesn’t only directly compete with the hardware markers in the smartphone market but also become
an important tactic partner from the perspective of outsourcing. For simplicity, the hardware maker taking the order from the OS
provider may charge wi per quantity and its marginal production cost can be reduced to c - e due to the benefit resulting from
large-scale production. We consider that the OS provider can always delegate an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to
produce its smartphone and the OEM charges c per quantity, which is a very competitive price because it is not higher than other
hardware maker’s marginal production cost. Accordingly, in the scenario of outsourcing, the profit of the hardware maker i
receiving the order is given by pi

(c - e)?(qi

= piqi + b (1- g)?qi

qg ,i )+ wiqg ,i , where qg ,i is the quantities of the OS

provider’s smartphone when outsourcing its order to hardware maker i. As for the OS provider, its profit in the scenario of
outsourcing can be expressed as p g ,i =

( pg -

)

(

wi ) qg ,i + b 跂g (qi + q j ) + qg ,i .
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The outsourcing process of the OS provider is as follows:
(i) The OS provider outsources its production work to either hardware maker 1 or 2.
(ii) The hardware maker decides the outsourcing cost per quantity wi .
(iii) The OS provider accepts or rejects the offer. If the negotiation has been broken, the OS provider outsources the production
work to an OEM.
Proposition 5. (The decision of vertical outsourcing for open-source operating system provider)
The OS provider should delegate the hardware marker with less product competitiveness to make its own brand of smartphone if
outsourcing to either of the hardware makers can be better off. Formally, when Min

{pg ,i , pg , j }> p g ,Y , p g ,i >

p g , j if

qi < qj .
Our result shows that the OS provider shouldn’t outsource its production work to the hardware maker dominating the market when
its smartphone business can be more profitable by outsourcing the production work to any hardware maker than an OEM. From
the analysis of the outsourcing cost per quantity, we find that a hardware maker with relatively weak product competitiveness is
willing to charge a lower fee for the manufacturing work than the one with strong product competitiveness. This finding reminds
the OS provider of the possible outcome that delegating a big hardware maker to produce its handsets could not gain the highest
profit. To ensure the better profitability of the OS provider, an sensible alternative for achieving a low outsourcing cost is to notify
the hardware maker that the negotiation could be broken if the manufacturing cost is too high and its major rival will be considered
in the next run of negotiation.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we consider a supply chain consisting of an open-source OS provider and two hardware makers. Both hardware
makers can have their own advertising revenue from in-app ads and share a portion of ad revenue from preload apps specified in
the agreement with the OS provider. The OS provider can require more number of preload apps to increase its mobile ad revenue
but such a strategy may intensify the competition in the smartphone market due to less production differentiation, which may not
always benefit its profit in the end. Moreover, we also examine the decision of making the OS provider’s own brand of
smartphones. To leverage the advantage from economies of scale, the OS provider may outsource its production work to a suitable
hardware maker. As a result, the relationship between the OS provider and the hardware maker having the production order could
be both partners and competitors. By applying a styled Cournot differentiation model, several helpful findings are discovered.
First, the OS provider should reduce the number of reload apps if the demand of advertising market is so high or more firms decide
to launch their own brand of handsets. The purpose of preloading less number of apps is to facilitate product differentiation so that
it will soften the intensive competition among hardware makers and incentivize them to create more market demand. Second, we
prescribe the condition under which the strategy of making the OS provider’s own brand of smartphones will take more advantage
than receiving mobile adverting revenue only when market factors such as production cost or market profitability changes. Finally,
in the scenario of vertical outsourcing, we find that the OS provider may gain more by contracting with a “relatively weak”
hardware maker because the other with strong product competitiveness can manipulate the whole market so that it will charge a
higher outsourcing fee.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Given i =

1, 2 , solving 順p i

Next, after incorporating

順p g

qi = 0 where simultaneously qi   

 2     a  c  1    β   2θi  θ j



qi   into (3), we have    Min 1, 4 

u = 0 . Accordingly, we have

where i ¹

4  2



2a + θ1 + θ 2 - 2c

j.

 2a  2β  2c  θ1  θ2   2
β

 by solving



¶u
=< 0 and
¶b
2β gβ (4gβ + 2a + 2β + θ1 + θ 2 - 2c)

2a + 2β + θ1 + θ 2 - 2c
¶u
=< 0.
¶g
2g gβ (4gβ + 2a + 2β + θ1 + θ 2 - 2c)
Proof of Proposition 2

翫
÷
qi = ççça + qˆ - 2qi - u ?å q j c÷
+ b (1- g )?u b (1- u ) . In a homogenous equilibrium,
÷
÷
ç儑
j¹ j
a + qˆ - c + b (1- ug )

*
. Subsequently, after incorporating qi   into (3) ,
q1 = q2 = L = qn so that we have qi =
u ?(n 1) + 2

Note

that

順p i

(

solving 順
pg

)

u = 0 can yield u * so that we may straightforwardly have


 2β
  

n

 a  β  ˆ  c   n 1  4β   2  a  β  ˆ  c   n  1  4β 
2 β   a  β  ˆ  c   n  1  2β   n  1

2



 . As a result, it is intuitive to

2

verify  n  0 from the above equation.


Proof of Proposition 3

 g ,Y   g , N 

L1  L2

4  2      1   2 
2

2

, where

L1    2    θ1  θ2   2   2    θ g    a    c   4   2   4 3

L2    θ1  θ2    2    a+  c    2    θ g  2β
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L1  L2
Note that
 0 . Letting θ1  θ2  θ g , we can show the following results because   4  4 2  3   4 can be
 g
verified in a numerically approach.







   4   θ  a  c     4  β    4  4  2  
   4   θ  a  c     4  4  3   4  
   4   θ  a  c   0
L    2     θ  a  β  c   2  0
L1   2  4  θ g  a  β  c    4  4 2  2 
2

2

2

g

2

2

g

2

g

2

g

Proof of Proposition 4
(1)

 g ,Y


Therefore,
(2)  g ,Y

 g , N





 g ,Y


  g ,N 









 4 2β  2 1  2   4  β     θ1  θ 2  θ g   2θ g   2     a  β  c 
 g , N


when

a

 2 1  2   4 β     θ

1

 2   

 θ 2  θ g   2θ g



  β+c

L1  L2

4  2      1   2 
2

2

L1  L2
L  L
  1 2  2  2    2 3β  4  a  β  c  θ g    2  a  β  c  θ1  θ2  θ g   2  θ1  θ2  2θ g 
a
c
 g ,Y
 g , N
L1  L2
 2  2    2 3β   4   2   a  β  c  θ g   0
Therefore,
when θ1  θ 2  θ g because

a
a
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Proof of Proposition 5

翫
θ + θ j - 2θ g - 2b g + 2 ?wi
p g ,i = (qg ,i + 2b g ) qg ,i + b 跂
g çç i
ç儑
2- u
, where

q g ,i =

2c + e ÷
÷
÷
÷

(a + β)(2 - u ) + (2 + u )(θ g - wi )- u (θi + θ j - 2c + e )+ 2uβg
2 (2 - u )(1 + u )

(qg ,i + 2bg ) qg ,i

is a quadratic function of wi and

. Note that

翫
θ + θ j - 2θ g - 2b g + 2 ?wi
b跂
g çç i
ç儑
2- u

¶ 2 p g ,i
¶ wi2

> 0 ; in addition,

2c + e ÷
÷
is an increasing
÷
÷

*

function of wi . Therefore, solving p g ,i = p g ,Y yields two roots. When the root of wi is the smaller one, qg ,i > 0 and

¶ p g ,i ? wi

0 ; on the other hand, qg ,i < 0 and ¶ p g ,i ? wi

0 when the root of wi* is the larger one. Therefore, we

consider the case in which the interior solution of wi is the smaller one for p g ,i = p g ,Y ; otherwise, only the boundary solution
exists. Note that the formulations of p g ,1 and p g ,2 are the same other than w1 and w2 ; thus, we aim to find the smallest
outsourcing fee, which enables the OS provider to gain more. Solving p g ,i = p g ,Y , we have

(

)

2 (2 + u - 2u 2 )θ g + u 3 (qi - bg ) + (u 2 + u )(4 - 3u ) + (4 + 2u ) (c - e )
*
i

w =

(

)

+ (2 - u )(a + b ) + u (θ g - θ j + bg + e ) (2 + 2u - u 2 )
3

8 + 8u - 2u - 3u 2

W.L.O.G., we assume θ 2 > θ1 . As a result, the following inequalities complete the proof.
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*
1

*
2

3

w < w ? u q1
? u 2q1

uθ 2 (2 + 2u - u ) < u q2 - u θ1 (2 + 2u - u
2

3

2

)

θ 2 (2 + 2u - u 2 ) < u 2q2 - θ1 (2 + 2u - u 2 )

? - θ 2 (2

2u ) < - θ1 (2 + 2u )

Û θ 2 > θ1
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